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SUBPRIME EDUCATION: FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES AND THE PROBLEM WITH TITLE 
IV FEDERAL STUDENT AID 
MATTHEW A. MCGUIRE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Federal student-aid policy is designed with the goal of expanding 
access to higher education for all students. It has been enormously 
successful in achieving that goal. Yet, for many students, federal 
student aid has served only to burden them with oppressive student-
debt obligations. These obligations are a particular problem with 
respect to the for-profit higher-education sector, which receives a large 
and ever-growing proportion of federal aid. This Note examines the 
interaction between federal student-aid policy and for-profit 
institutions, arguing that the noble goals of modern federal student-
aid policy enable the very practices that lead to negative outcomes for 
many students by creating a lucrative market for “subprime 
education.” This Note analyzes a continuum of approaches to 
reducing the negative student outcomes caused by many for-profit 
institutions, concluding that the blame lies not with for-profit 
institutions but with federal student-aid policy. Ultimately, the modern 
federal student-aid regime requires regulators to choose between 
abetting negative student outcomes and reducing access to higher 
education. This dilemma can be avoided only by deemphasizing the 
student-oriented aid model in favor of an institution-centered model 
that is focused on reducing the price of education. 
INTRODUCTION 
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA)1 established 
the foundation for federal student aid in higher education.2 The HEA 
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rests upon the basic premise that every student, regardless of personal 
wealth, should have the opportunity to pursue career training or a 
degree.3 “[T]his Nation could never rest while the door to knowledge 
remained closed to any American,” President Johnson said after 
signing the bill.4 
Today, the United States continues to make a substantial 
financial commitment to keeping the “door to knowledge” open for 
all. During the 2009–10 academic year, the federal government 
awarded $146.5 billion in grants and loans to students through Title 
IV programs.5  Title IV funds go toward programs at every degree 
level, to traditional and nontraditional students, and to students at 
public, private nonprofit, and private for-profit colleges and 
universities alike.6 
Indeed, a significant share of those funds has gone to students at 
for-profit institutions. During the 2009-10 academic year, the for-
profit sector received $32 billion in Title IV student aid—more than 
20 percent of all federal aid.7 These institutions have been 
instrumental in expanding access to higher education for populations 
historically underserved by public and nonprofit institutions: adult 
nontraditional students, students from disadvantaged economic 
 
 1. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, 79 Stat. 1232 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070 to 1099c-2, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2756b (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2011)). 
 2. E.g., Brian Pusser & David A. Wolcott, A Crowded Lobby: Nonprofit and For-Profit 
Universities and the Emerging Politics of Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: 
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES 167, 170 (David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah 
E. Turner eds., 2006). 
 3. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 28 (1965) (“What is badly needed now is a comprehensive 
program for financing the college costs of all who have a legitimate need.”). 
 4. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at Southwest Texas State College upon Signing 
the Higher Education Act of 1965, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1102, 1105 (Nov. 8, 1965). 
 5. NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM’RS, FEDERAL STUDENT FINANCIAL AID: 
2011 NATIONAL PROFILE OF PROGRAMS IN TITLE IV OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 2 
(2011), available at http://www.nasfaa.org/EntrancePDF.aspx?id=5328. 
 6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (defining eligible institutions). Institutions 
within the for-profit higher-education sector have also been named, among other terms, “career 
colleges” and “proprietary institutions.” E.g., Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default 
Rates at Proprietary Institutions and What Can Be Done To Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 225 
passim (2011); VA. CAREER COLL. ASS’N, http://www.va-cca.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2012). 
This Note will use the term “for-profit” to distinguish these institutions from higher-education 
providers that are organized as nonprofit institutions. 
 7. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: 
EXPERIENCES OF UNDERCOVER STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED 
COLLEGES 1 (2011) (reporting that the “for-profit colleges received almost $32 billion in grants 
and loans” under Title IV); supra text accompanying note 5. 
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backgrounds, and members of minority groups.8 But for-profit 
institutions are also strongly correlated with poor student outcomes. 
Compared to similar students at nonprofit institutions, students at 
for-profit institutions are more likely to fail to complete a degree, 
carry more onerous student-debt loads upon graduation, and default 
on student loans.9 Due in large part to these poor student outcomes, 
many for-profit institutions frequently find themselves in the news, 
characterized as unscrupulous or predatory,10 leading to questions 
about the propriety of government support for some for-profit 
institutions. In fact, federal aid constitutes nearly all of the revenue of 
many of the most prominent for-profit institutions.11 Unfortunately, 
current law incentivizes the practices of the for-profit sector that lead 
to negative outcomes. Much like lenders in the subprime mortgage 
market, for-profit institutions find themselves in a position to benefit 
handsomely from the debt of marginally creditworthy borrowers 
without bearing any accompanying risk. 
This Note examines the interaction between the Title IV student 
aid program and the for-profit higher-education industry.12 
Ultimately, Title IV’s portable-subsidy student-aid model lies at the 
root of the problems associated with many for-profit institutions.13 
Regulators attempting to alleviate these problems under the Title IV 
framework have an unsavory choice: tighten access to student aid 
and, therefore, restrict educational opportunity, or continue to 
 
 8. See Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict Between Public Good and For-
Profit Higher Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that such student groups “choose 
for-profit . . . education at disproportionate rates”); see also infra Part II.A.2. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See, e.g., Andréa Ford, Going for Broke, TIME, May 9, 2011, at 44, 44 (noting that 
“[a]necdote by anecdote, a firestorm has been building around for-profit education for some 
time” and referring to for-profit education as “a predatory industry”); Peter S. Goodman, In 
Hard Times, Lured into Trade School and Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Critics say 
many schools exaggerate the value of their degree programs, selling young people on dreams of 
middle-class wages while setting them up for default on untenable debts, low-wage work and a 
struggle to avoid poverty.”); Frontline: College, Inc. (PBS television broadcast May 4, 2010), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc (examining the controversy 
surrounding for-profit educational institutions). 
 11. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
 12. For an excellent recent discussion of the interaction between Title IV and for-profit 
institutions, see generally James, supra note 8. 
 13. The portable-subsidy model seeks to expand access to education by granting funds to 
students to use to defray education costs at their institution of choice. Brian Pusser, Higher 
Education, Markets, and the Preservation of the Public Good, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: 
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 23, 36. 
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facilitate negative student outcomes.14 Instead, a reemphasis of the 
public-supply model would allow government to avoid that dilemma.15 
Part I of this Note outlines the goals and structure of the current 
regime for administering and regulating federal student aid. Part II 
explores the rise of the for-profit education industry and the 
consequences of its expansion. Part III analyzes the impact of the 
current legal and regulatory student-aid regime on the for-profit 
education industry, concluding that Title IV student aid enables the 
negative outcomes associated with the industry and that the tools that 
the Title IV regime provides to reduce the occurrence of these 
outcomes are ineffective. Finally, Part IV examines a continuum of 
possible approaches to solving the systemic issues introduced in Part 
III. Ultimately, none of these approaches prove satisfying. This Note, 
then, suggests looking outside of the Title IV portable-subsidy 
framework for a solution. 
I.  TITLE IV STUDENT AID 
Title IV student aid represents one of many possible approaches 
to increasing access to higher education. This Part explores the 
evolution of Title IV’s student-oriented financial-aid model and 
outlines the regulatory regime surrounding the program. 
A. The Preeminence of Market-Oriented Student Aid 
Prior to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill),16 
federal support for higher education took the form of direct support 
for public institutions, such as land grants for state universities 
through legislation such as the Morrill Act.17 The G.I. Bill, by 
contrast, created a student-aid program oriented around portable 
 
 14. See infra Part IV. This Note also argues that more finely tuned regulation, although 
potentially helpful, does not sufficiently solve this fundamental dilemma. See infra Part IV.C. 
 15. The public-supply model entails supporting public educational institutions as a means 
of reducing the price of education for students. Pusser, supra note 13, at 34–35. 
 16. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (G.I. Bill), ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284, replaced by 
Veterans’ Benefits, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 17. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301–309 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); see also GARY A. BERG, LESSONS FROM THE EDGE: FOR-PROFIT AND 
NONTRADITIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 40 (2005) (describing the Morrill Act, 
which provided land grants to endow colleges designated by a state’s legislature, and its 
importance to the development of state institutions of higher education). 
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subsidies.18 Title IV of the HEA further expanded upon this model by 
offering grants to the neediest students and a guaranteed student-loan 
program to low- and middle-income students.19 The guaranteed 
student-loan program encouraged private lenders to offer student 
loans on favorable terms to the borrower.20 
Though students at for-profit institutions were allowed to receive 
funds from the original G.I. Bill,21 the for-profit sector was associated 
with “[s]candals, fraud, and abuse.”22 As a result, the HEA originally 
only offered aid to students at nonprofit higher-education 
institutions.23 In 1972, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to using 
portable subsidies24 when it amended the HEA to make Title IV 
funds available to students at for-profit and career-oriented schools.25 
Future amendments also shared the goal of expanding access to 
higher education through portable subsidies.26 
 
 18. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 36 (“GI Bill grants . . . were awarded to individuals rather 
than to institutions and served as a forerunner to [Title IV] . . . .”). See supra note 13 for a brief 
description of the portable-subsidy student-aid model. 
 19. S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 23 (1965). Educational opportunity grants were later renamed 
Pell Grants. Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, tit. IV, pt. A, sec. 402(a), 
§ 411(a)(1)(C), 94 Stat. 1367, 1401 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2011)). 
 20. Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students 
To Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 21 
(2011). 
 21. See G.I. Bill §§ 3, 11, 58 Stat. at 288–90 (stating that students could receive aid for 
enrolling “at any approved educational or training institution,” defined broadly without 
reference to the nonprofit or for-profit status of the institution). 
 22. KEVIN KINSER, FROM MAIN STREET TO WALL STREET: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 21 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. IV, pt. B, § 421(a)(1), 
79 Stat. 1232, 1236 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) (opening 
the guaranteed loan program to “[s]tates and nonprofit private institutions and organizations”). 
 24. Cf. Pusser & Wolcott, supra note 2, at 170 (“[A] contest was waged over whether the 
focus of federal financial support should be on institutions . . . or on direct student aid . . . .”). 
 25. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. I, pt. D, § 417B(a), 86 Stat. 
235, 258, replaced by Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-374, 94 Stat. 1367 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 640c-2, scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. § 2753 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The HEA was expanded to include for-profit institutions in order to 
“broaden the range of options beyond traditional baccalaureate programs.” Sarah E. Turner, 
For-Profit Colleges in the Context of the Market for Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM 
LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 51, 55. 
 26. For example, the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-49, 
93 Stat. 351, enacted measures to entice private lenders to lend at larger amounts to students at 
for-profit institutions. These efforts to expand the impact of Title IV have continued to the 
present day, marked by the elimination of the 50-percent rule for distance education, see infra 
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The evolution of the Title IV program reflects a longstanding 
commitment to expanding access for students within the market for 
higher education. Broad societal access to higher education is thought 
to provide certain civic benefits, such as increasing the population’s 
ability to participate in democratic institutions,27 developing future 
leaders,28 addressing shortages of skilled or educated workers, and 
promoting American competitiveness in scientific and technological 
development.29 If higher education furthers the public good, as the 
HEA appears to contemplate, then government intervention to 
increase production is justified.30 Of course, higher education confers 
substantial private benefits on individuals as well.31 Even in 1965, 
higher education was seen as increasingly necessary for modern 
workers,32 a trend that has only accelerated in the modern 
information economy.33 
Federal efforts to expand access to higher education can 
generally be classified under one of two approaches. The public-
supply model involves direct public investment in educational 
institutions.34 These subsidized institutions, in turn, can expand access 
to higher education because they can offer education at a lower price. 
This is the dominant approach at the state level35—states operate 
 
note 73, and the federal government becoming the direct lender for all Title IV loans in 2010 
and reinvesting the savings into the Pell Grant program, Glater, supra note 20, at 31. 
 27. Pusser, supra note 13, at 37. 
 28. Glater, supra note 20, at 18. 
 29. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 20 (1965) (“[C]urrent and future shortages of trained 
personnel present a serious threat to an expanding and viable economy.”). 
 30. See Glater, supra note 20, at 36 (exploring congressional rhetoric about the need for the 
nation to expand access to higher education). 
 31. See id. at 37 (listing economic benefits associated with education, including higher 
levels of employment and wealth, mobility within the labor market, and better working 
conditions). 
 32. See S. REP. NO. 89-621, at 4 (“Schooling has become and will continue increasingly to 
be a normal part of adult life.”). 
 33. See Aaron N. Taylor, “Your Results May Vary”: Protecting Students and Taxpayers 
Through Tighter Regulation of Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 744–
45 (2010) (“This relatively new emphasis on knowledge as a tool of economic vitality has . . . 
changed the motivations and mindsets of students.”). 
 34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Bridget Terry Long, Does the Format of a Financial Aid Program Matter? The 
Effect of State In-Kind Tuition Subsidies. 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 767, 767 (2004) (“State 
appropriations to public colleges form the most significant higher aid policy in the United 
States.”); see also e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1801 (West 2012) (appropriating state 
funds directly to state institutions and, in much smaller quantities, to student financial-aid 
programs); Act of Dec. 20, 2011, S.H.B. 2058, pt. VI, §§ 601–609, 2011 Wash. Adv. Legis. Serv. 
2nd Spec. Sess. Ch. 9 (Lexis Nexis) (allocating over $2 billion to state universities and 
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massive public university systems, in addition to community 
colleges—and abroad.36 Before the HEA, the direct support of 
institutions was also the federal government’s dominant approach, 
through programs such as the Morrill Act that assisted states in 
providing affordable higher education.37 
By contrast, the portable-subsidy model embodied by Title IV 
involves granting students portable government benefits, such as 
grants or loans with favorable terms, to expand access to higher 
education by enabling the student to defray the costs of attendance.38 
These two approaches may seem similar, but the differences between 
funding an institution and funding an individual student are great. 
Title IV, therefore, represents a major shift in federal higher-
education policy. In an effort to “provid[e] the necessary and needed 
tools” for higher education, the federal government primarily shifted 
those tools to students as market actors rather than to state and local 
higher-education institutions.39 
B. Title IV Eligibility for Institutions 
A complicated regulatory triad determines a higher-education 
provider’s eligibility to receive Title IV funds from students. The triad 
consists of state government, the higher-education industry, and the 
 
community colleges over two years and $300 million to financial aid); FISCAL SERVS. DIV., 
IOWA LEGIS. SERVS. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF FY 2012 BUDGET AND DEPARTMENT REQUESTS 
73–76 (2010), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/lsaReports/BudgetAnalysis/Budg
 Analysis2012. pdf (cataloguing nearly $500 million allocated by the state to fund its universities, 
in contrast to under $60 million for the state’s financial aid budget). 
 36. David D. Dill, Allowing the Market To Rule: The Case of the United States, 57 HIGHER 
EDUC. Q. 136, 137 (2003). 
 37. Id. at 136; supra note 15. Given the diversity of actions this approach contemplates and 
their varied policy implications, for the purposes of this Note, readers are encouraged to 
envision simple grants to states or state public institutions as a paradigmatic manifestation of the 
public-supply model. Federal support for educational institutions could, however, take 
innumerable forms. On one extreme, the federal government could invest in operating its own 
educational institutions, and investments under the public-supply model need not be limited to 
public institutions—substantial tax breaks offered to public and private nonprofit educators 
alike would qualify as well.  
 38. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 32 (explaining that the HEA is founded upon a market 
model). The Pell Grant, essentially an education voucher, is perhaps the quintessential example 
of the portable-subsidy model. See supra note 13. 
 39. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1104; see also David W. Breneman, Brian Pusser & Sarah E. 
Turner, The Contemporary Provision of For-Profit Higher Education: Mapping the Competitive 
Market, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, 
at 3, 6 (“HEA also shifted control of the largest share of federal financial-aid dollars from 
institutions to individuals.”). 
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federal government.40 Title IV requires states to establish “minimum 
standards for integrity, financial stability, and educational quality.”41 
States also regulate higher-education providers through a variety of 
channels unrelated to Title IV eligibility, such as consumer-protection 
statutes and tort law.42 
Title IV requires higher-education institutions to be accredited 
by a federally recognized accrediting agency.43 Accrediting agencies, 
which are made up of professionals from the education industry, 
evaluate educational methods.44 Though accreditation has become a 
critical part of the government’s Title IV regulatory structure, to 
accreditors, the process is not viewed as a method of ensuring 
minimum educational standards.45 
In determining eligibility for Title IV, the federal government, 
through the Department of Education, declines to evaluate 
pedagogical effectiveness.46 The Department of Education does, 
however, certify accreditation organizations; only certified accreditors 
may grant the accreditation required for Title IV eligibility.47 These 
federal standards are generally procedural and structural, designed to 
ensure that the accrediting agencies themselves are worthy arbiters of 
quality.48 The federal government also monitors institutional 
compliance with Title IV regulations to ensure only eligible students 
receive federal student aid.49 
 
 40. Mark L. Pelesh, Markets, Regulation, and Performance in Higher Education, in FOR-
PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND 
PLACE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 91, 92 (Guilbert C. Hentschke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William 
G. Tierney eds., 2010). 
 41. LISA K. FOSTER, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CRB 04-010, FOR-PROFIT 
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF ACCREDITATION AND STATE 
AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 3 (2004), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/04/10/04-010.pdf. 
 42. See Patrick F. Linehan, Note, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing 
Proprietary Schools’ Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 763–78 (2001) (discussing state-level 
public and private law relating to for-profit institutions). 
 43. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(j) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 44. Pelesh, supra note 40, at 92. 
 45. JANE V. WELLMAN, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, RECOGNITION 
OF ACCREDITATION ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON OF POLICY & PRACTICE OF 
VOLUNTARY ACCREDITATION AND THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 4 
(1998), available at http:// www.chea.org/pdf/RecognitionWellman_Jan1998.pdf. 
 46. Pelesh, supra note 40, at 92. 
 47. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a). 
 48. WELLMAN, supra note 45, at 3. 
 49. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-600, PROPRIETARY 
SCHOOLS: STRONGER DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE 
ONLY ELIGIBLE STUDENTS RECEIVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2009), available at 
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Finally, the Department of Education also administers a variety 
of institutional-eligibility rules regarding receipt of Title IV funds. If 
an institution’s former students have unacceptably high cohort default 
rates on Title IV loans, for example, the institution loses the ability to 
accept Title IV funds.50 A cohort default rate is a measure of the 
number of students who default on their student loans compared to 
the total number of students who began repayment on their loans at 
the beginning of a measured period.51 Loans are considered to be in 
default if a student is 270 or 360 days behind payments—depending 
on the loan—within the first three years of repayment.52 
Some Department of Education rules apply only to for-profit 
institutions.  The 90/10 rule, for example, requires that a school 
receive at least 10 percent of its revenue from non-Title IV sources.53 
Federal and state student aid from other programs, such as veterans’ 
benefits or federal and state job training grants, actually count toward 
the 10 percent, along with institutional loans offered to students by 
the school itself.54 Additionally, for-profit institutions are barred in 
most instances from offering recruiters incentive-based payments.55 
Finally, a for-profit institution must offer programs that prepare 
students for “gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”56 For 
most of the statute’s history, this HEA provision had little force 
because it merely prohibited programs with no direct connection to 
recognized occupations.57 In 2011, however, Department of Education 
 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294057.pdf (examining the rigor of Title IV compliance oversight 
by the Department of Education). 
 50. 34 C.F.R. § 668.206(a) (2012). 
 51. Johnson, supra note 6 at 233. 
 52. 34 C.F.R. § 668.183(c). 
 53. Id. § 668.28(a). 
 54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-4, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: LARGE 
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLS THAT SPECIALIZE IN HEALTHCARE ARE MORE LIKELY TO RELY 
HEAVILY ON FEDERAL STUDENT AID 14 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
320/310897.pdf; see also infra Part III.B.2. 
 55. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(i) (2011), vacated in part by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & 
Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The D.C. Circuit required the Department of 
Education to retain a safe-harbor rule allowing incentive compensation based upon students’ 
program completion rates. Id. at 448. 
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 57. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A09E0015, 
UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX’S PROCESSING OF STUDENT FINANCIAL AID DISBURSEMENTS FOR 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, TITLE IV PROGRAMS 8 (2005), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/a09e0015.pdf (interpreting the “gainful 
employment” provision, 34 C.F.R. § 668.8 (2005), to prohibit the University of Phoenix to 
receive Title IV funds for an associate’s degree program in General Studies). 
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regulations attempted to condition Title IV eligibility on student 
outcomes: measures of students’ loan repayment and debt-to-earnings 
ratios.58 Those debt measures, however, were vacated by a federal 
district court in 2012, and when—or in what form—they will take 
effect remains in doubt.59 
II.  FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 
For-profit institutions are a major force within the modern 
higher-education industry. This Part explains the historical evolution 
and defining characteristics of the industry and explores the 
theoretical justifications supporting the for-profit sector’s social value. 
This Part then analyzes negative student outcomes closely associated 
with many for-profit institutions. 
A.  Overview of the For-Profit Higher-Education Industry 
1. History and recent growth.  The modern for-profit higher-
education industry is marked by the incredible diversity of its 
institutions.60 The University of Phoenix, a giant in the industry and 
by far the largest of all of the corporate schools, boasts hundreds of 
thousands of students, campuses across America, and programs in 
 
 58. For a full explanation of how these measures were calculated, see 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 
(2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 
WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012). 
 59.  Duncan, 2012 WL 2505237, at *1. It is quite possible—perhaps even likely—that these 
rules will reemerge soon. The district court found that the gainful employment rules themselves 
were a permissible exercise of the Department of Education’s rulemaking authority in this 
arena. Id. at *8. Rather, the specific thresholds set by the Department of Education for the loan-
repayment measures were arbitrary and capricious, “not based upon any facts at all.” Id. at *1, 
*15. The other student outcome measures were found to be inseverable from the loan-
repayment measure and the entire substantive rule was vacated. Id. at *16. Nevertheless, the 
Department of Education plans to use its established rulemaking authority to restore the 
framework designed by the gainful-employment rules. Goldie Blumenstyk & Charles 
Huckabee, Judge’s Ruling on ‘Gainful Emplyoment’ Gives Each Side Something To Cheer, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 2, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Ruling-on-Gainful-
Employment/132737. 
 60. This Note will only discuss for-profit institutions that offer a bona-fide educational 
experience to students. For an overview of the phenomenon of “diploma mills,” which are 
businesses that provide unearned educational certification, see generally Amanda Harmon 
Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit Colleges and Universities: Business 
Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505 (2009). 
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many fields and at virtually all degree levels.61 Yet most for-profit 
institutions serve fewer than one hundred students and provide 
training in a specific field such as hair styling or clerical work.62 
The for-profit higher-education industry traces back centuries.63 
Generous Progressive-era programs following the public-supply 
model diminished the sector’s influence in the early twentieth 
century, as the modern research university became prominent and as 
states began to sponsor vocational education through community 
colleges.64 The 1972 amendments to the HEA transformed the 
industry by opening for-profit schools up for federal student aid.65 
Meanwhile, increasing employer demand for trained white-collar 
workers made students more willing to buy what for-profit educators 
were selling.66 For-profit institutions capitalized on these 
opportunities. Between the 1970s and the 2000s the industry “shifted 
from one of loosely affiliated, independently operated vocational 
schools to one that is streamlined, highly sophisticated, and investor-
focused.”67 
Beginning in the 1990s, the for-profit sector became marked by 
massive, publicly traded companies.68 For-profit institutions have 
always aggressively controlled their costs, but it was not until this 
period that the industry fully realized profitable economies of scale.69 
Between 1998 and 2008, enrollment at for-profit schools increased by 
225 percent; by the end of that period enrollment totaled nearly 
twenty million students.70 Between 2008 and 2010, the rate of 
increases in enrollment within the sector doubled.71 A small number 
of large schools are responsible for this increase. In 2009, five 
 
 61. David W. Breneman, The University of Phoenix: Icon of For-Profit Higher Education, 
in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING, supra note 2, at 71, 71–73. 
 62. Linehan, supra note 42, at 755–56. 
 63. RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED., INC.: THE RISE OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY 
54–57 (2001). 
 64. KINSER, supra note 22, at 19. 
 65. Breneman et al., supra note 39, at 6. 
 66. See supra note 33. 
 67. Johnson, supra note 26, at 230. 
 68. KINSER, supra note 22, at 22.  
 69. See id. at 85–89 (discussing how for-profit institutions generate economies of scale).  
 70. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 2 (2010). 
 71. Goodman, supra note 10. 
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institutions alone enrolled over 800,000 students.72 Much of that 
growth was fueled by online education. After the 2005 repeal of the 
50-percent rule, which prohibited Title IV-eligible schools from 
enrolling more than half of their students in distance-education 
courses, for-profit schools expanded their online programs with vigor, 
and new, predominantly online institutions emerged.73 In fact, for-
profit institutions now enroll more students online than at physical 
campuses.74 Higher education can be a lucrative business. The eight 
largest publicly held and the eight largest privately held for-profit 
institutions earned a combined profit of $2.7 billion dollars in 2009.75 
2. Students at for-profit institutions.  Student populations in the 
for-profit sector are as diverse as the institutions themselves, with 
demographics varying depending on the degree programs offered. 
For-profit institutions serve comparatively more low-income students 
and members of underrepresented minority groups than nonprofit 
institutions,76 and the industry caters to first-generation college 
students.77 For-profit schools have also been enormously successful in 
attracting older adult students.78 The diversity of the student 
population is unsurprising, given the industry’s traditional focus on 
vocational training. As the industry has grown, however, much of the 
growth has come from students pursuing four-year degrees, not from 
vocational education.79 
B.  For-Profit Higher Education in Theory 
Proponents of the for-profit sector contend that the sector’s 
increasing success is a reflection of the changing nature of higher 
 
 72. Taylor, supra note 33, at 756. 
 73. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., at 2. 
 74. Jason G. Caudill, Questions and Research Opportunities in Online Education, 39 BRIT. 
J. EDUC. TECH. 920, 920 (2008). 
 75. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON THE 
FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 4 (2010). 
 76. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of 
Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and Success), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Abernathy.pdf. 
 77. BERG, supra note 17, at 79. 
 78. RUCH, supra note 63, at 145–46; James, supra note 8, at 83. 
 79. KINSER, supra note 22, at 73. 
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education.80 In a globalized, information-based economy, higher 
education—whether it takes the form of a certificate, a two-year 
degree, a four-year degree, or beyond—is increasingly necessary for 
the American workforce.81 Students “increasingly view[] education as 
a product and themselves as consumers.”82  This notion of the student-
as-consumer has fundamentally altered the student-educator 
relationship. 
This consumer-centric view of education comports well with the 
for-profit education model. To schools like the University of Phoenix, 
education is a product, and students are consumers.83 For-profit 
schools tout their no-frills, businesslike approach, and many students 
respond favorably.84 Students at for-profit institutions seek a specific 
educational experience, tailored toward career advancement, and 
have little desire for all the trappings of a traditional undergraduate 
education.85 
Furthermore, for-profit institutions have stepped into a void not 
filled by traditional higher education, an industry that is to some 
degree unwilling to meet this increasing demand for higher education. 
Nonprofit institutions are certainly not required to pursue growth 
strategies, and in practice they do not—often opting to increase their 
institutional prestige instead.86 By maintaining restrictive admission 
 
 80. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 135–59 (discussing the changes taking place in higher 
education and what nonprofit institutions could learn from for-profit schools). 
 81. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 744 (“[J]ust like the knowledge-based economy facilitates 
opportunity and success for possessors of vital knowledge, [higher education] ‘increasingly 
eliminates those without education and training beyond high school from employment 
opportunities that can support a middle-class standard of living.’” (quoting NAT’L CTR. FOR 
PUB. POLICY & HIGHER EDUC., MEASURING UP 2006: THE NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON 
HIGHER EDUCATION 20 (2006), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/News/Press_Releases/Higher_education_performance/Measuring_Up_ 2006
.pdf)). 
 82. Taylor, supra note 33, at 745. 
 83. RUCH, supra note 63, at 144. 
 84. See id. at 132–34 (illustrating the “no-nonsense academic experience” provided by for-
profit institutions). 
 85. See id. at 134 (“For-profit students are serious about their studies. Their goal is to ‘get 
in, get out, and get a job,’ and they are not particularly concerned about their collegiate social 
life. . . .”); see also Michelle Howard-Vital, The Appeal of For-Profit Institutions, CHANGE: 
MAG. HIGHER LEARNING, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 68, 70 (“Although for-profits rarely offer extensive 
campus and student activities in comparison to more traditional institutions, students do not 
appear to miss them.”). 
 86. RUCH, supra note 63, at 16. 
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standards, many nonprofit schools exclude large populations of 
students, but for-profit institutions are open to anyone who can pay.87 
But admissions standards do not tell the whole story. The 
nonprofit institutions that place the least emphasis on admissions 
standards, such as community colleges, are also becoming less able to 
increase access to education.88 State funding for public institutions, 
once merely trending downward, has plummeted because of 
recessionary budget shortfalls.89 As a result of decreased public 
financial support, tuition has increased sharply when it merely 
increased steadily in the past.90 Because public institutions seek to 
expand access to higher education by using direct subsidies to keep 
tuition prices low,91 the erosion of those subsidies—and the 
commensurate increase in tuition prices—greatly impairs those 
institutions’ ability to expand access to higher education. 
Traditional higher education is also an industry dominated by 
norms and tradition.92 For all their virtues, these norms cause 
traditional colleges and universities to be slow to respond to threats 
or opportunities.93 For-profit schools share none of these constraints, 
and they respond rapidly to market changes.94 For example, many 
institutions have virtually eliminated admissions standards to take 
 
 87. Cf. Dill, supra note 36, at 149 (noting nonprofit institutions’ “overwhelming focus on 
admissions selectivity”). Title IV, of course, seeks to ensure that, if admitted to a higher-
education institution, anyone can pay. 
 88. See STEPHEN G. KATSINAS, MARK M. D’AMICO & JANICE N. FRIEDEL, ACCESS AND 
FUNDING IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION—THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY (2011) (surveying 
diminishing financial resources for public education). On the other hand, arguments can be 
made that consumer demand is actually unduly inflated because of Title IV student aid policies. 
See infra Part IV.B. 
 89. KATSINAS ET AL., supra note 88, at 4; see also Lee Gardner & Goldie Blumenstyk, At 
Calif. Public Colleges, Dreams Deferred, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 17, 2012, at A4 
(outlining how state budget cuts greatly constrain California state universities’ educational 
capacities). 
 90. KATSINAS ET AL., supra note 88, at 6. 
 91. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 92. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 149 (“[M]any traditional colleges and universities have 
been resistant to change, responding slowly and adapting reluctantly.”); cf. Dill, supra note 36, 
at 139 n.3 (“[A]cademic freedom and tenure in the US has been more influenced by 
professional norms and sanctions than by government regulation.”). 
 93. See, e.g., RUCH, supra note 63, at 14 (“Standing in the way of quick, effective decision 
making is the tradition of shared governance.”). 
 94. See id. at 149 (acknowledging “how quickly and effectively some of the for-profit 
education companies have responded to change”). 
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advantage of the “disadvantaged student market.”95 For-profit 
institutions offer targeted, in-demand programs, lack tenure, conduct 
no research, and operate year-round.96 
If the purpose of the HEA is to expand access to higher 
education for those who are otherwise unable to participate, then 
arguably no sector of the higher-education industry serves that 
purpose better than the for-profit sector.97 By catering to groups that 
have been traditionally absent from higher education, for-profit 
institutions are expanding access.98 Proponents also argue that for-
profit institutions achieve the goal of expanding access to higher 
education at less cost to the taxpayer than would nonprofit 
institutions. For-profit institutions receive almost all their revenue 
from tuition.99 By contrast, public institutions receive a smaller 
portion of their revenues via tuition and a large proportion from 
public subsidy.100 Private nonprofit institutions receive comparatively 
less revenue from tuition and rely on donations to cover the 
balance.101 Nonprofit institutions also receive significant tax breaks, 
whereas for-profit institutions pay taxes on the profits they 
generate.102 Finally, proponents of the for-profit sector argue that 
their profit motive leads to pedagogical innovation in comparison to 
calcified traditional institutions.103 
C.  Negative Outcomes Associated with the For-Profit Sector 
1. Unsavory Practices.  Unfortunately, the practices of many for-
profit institutions may undermine their proponents’ arguments. 
Unlawful conduct appears to flourish within the sector. Between 1998 
 
 95. Bonnie K. Fox Garrity, Mark J. Garrison & Roger C. Fiedler, Access for Whom, Access 
to What? The Role of the “Disadvantaged Student” Market in the Rise of For-Profit Higher 
Education in the United States, 8 J. FOR CRITICAL EDUC. POL’Y STUD. 203, 205 (2010). 
 96. RUCH, supra note 63, at 75. 
 97. See BERG, supra note 17, at 79 (explaining the University of Phoenix’s desire to offer 
an efficient education that is “tied closely to the desire to provide access to diverse 
populations”). 
 98. See Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 219 (highlighting how the for-profit sector attracts 
disproportionate numbers of minority and low-income students). 
 99. RUCH, supra note 63, at 98. The remaining 5 percent comes from ancillary operations 
such as bookstores. Id. 
 100. Id. at 97–98. 
 101. Id. at 98. 
 102. Id. at 101. 
 103. Michael J. Seiden, For-Profit Colleges Deserve Some Respect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
July 10, 2009, at A80. 
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and 2004, 74 percent of the Department of Education’s institutional 
fraud cases involved for-profit schools,104 and the industry’s troubled 
history is well documented.105 The industry seems to be rid of schools 
that solicited enrollments and delivered literally nothing in return, but 
deceptive and fraudulent recruitment practices and unlawful receipt 
of Title IV aid still persist.106 
Much of this unlawful conduct stems from the heavy institutional 
emphasis on recruiting within the for-profit sector. Many for-profit 
schools run massive, aggressive sales operations, with teams of 
recruiters in call centers hunting any and all prospective students.107 
Many institutions’ recruiting strategies target the “disadvantaged 
student”108 and “inflate the high hopes of many students who may be 
unlikely to achieve the promised successes.”109 Student website 
queries can result in hundreds of calls.110 Military students are 
targeted with particular zeal, thanks to their generous veterans’ 
benefits.111 Even though institutions may not offer recruiters 
incentive-based pay in most instances,112 recruiters nonetheless feel 
tremendous pressure to bring in students, resulting in unlawful 
conduct even when the institutions themselves publicly disclaim such 
 
 104. DEANNE LOONIN & JULIA DEVANTHÉRY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MAKING 
THE NUMBERS COUNT: WHY PROPRIETARY SCHOOL PERFORMANCE DATA DOESN’T ADD UP 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 11 (2005). For-profit institutions account for less than 40 
percent of all higher-education institutions and only about 9 percent of all enrollments. Guilbert 
C. Hentchke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William G. Tierney, For-Profit Colleges and Universities in 
a Knowledge Economy, in FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THE RISE OF FOR-
PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 40, at 1, 2. 
 105. See, e.g., Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, 
supra note 76, at 14–16 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College 
Access and Success) (chronicling decades of concern over practices at for-profit institutions); see 
also supra notes 10, 22 and accompanying text. 
 106. LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 10. 
 107. E.g., Barry Yeoman, The High Price of For-Profit Colleges, ACADEME, May–June 
2011, at 32, 34. 
 108. Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 204–05. 
 109. Joshua Woods, Opportunity, Ease, Encouragement, and Shame: A Short Course in 
Pitching For-Profit Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13, 2006, at B10. 
 110. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES: 
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN 
DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 15 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125197.pdf. 
 111. See generally S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., 
BENEFITTING WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY 
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS (2010) (explaining the perverse incentives created by generous 
military educational-benefits programs); see also infra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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behavior.113 An undercover investigation by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that recruiters at every for-profit 
school targeted by the study made deceptive, if not totally fraudulent, 
statements to investigators posing as prospective students.114 For 
example, one school told the GAO’s undercover applicant that 
barbers could earn $250,000 per year; others encouraged the 
undercover applicant to take out large amounts of debt because “no 
one will come after you if you don’t pay.”115 
Educational expenses are minimized at many for-profit colleges 
and universities. The largest and most successful corporate schools 
standardize the curriculum and de-emphasize the faculty.116 At the 
University of Phoenix, most of the instructors are part-time, and 
central administrators determine course content.117 Some major for-
profit institutions spend more of their budgets on recruiting than on 
education.118 Others receive more revenue from Pell Grants alone 
than they spend in total instructional expenses.119 There is nothing 
legally problematic with such an arrangement, because Title IV does 
not require a school to allocate a certain amount of its budget toward 
education.120 
2. Debt, Dropouts, and Defaults.  Despite their low operating 
costs, for-profit institutions are expensive. Most for-profit programs 
cost more than the average nonprofit program,121 and students at for-
profit institutions are more likely to borrow than students at their 
 
 113. Even some industry proponents have difficulty denying this point. See, e.g., RUCH, 
supra note 63, at 96 (“[For-profit institutions] use selling techniques to enroll students, leading 
them through a decision process that, however inadvertently, is not always based on accurate 
information, may sometimes lead to a certain amount of misrepresentation, and usually involves 
sales closure tactics that pressure students to sign up.”). 
 114. For examples of these statements, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 110, at app. I. 
 115. Id. at 10, 12–13. 
 116. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 112, 118 (noting that for-profit institutions tend to manage 
the curriculum centrally and minimize the governing role of faculty). 
 117. Breneman, supra note 61, at 77. 
 118. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 6 (2010). 
 119. Garrity et al., supra note 95, at 217. There are some nonprofit institutions that do this 
as well, but there are comparatively few of them. Id. 
 120. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., at 5. 
 121. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note 
76, at 14 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and 
Success). 
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nonprofit counterparts.122 When students do borrow, they usually 
borrow more than students at nonprofit institutions.123 This is true 
even after accounting for demographics.124 Sometimes loans offered 
through federal aid programs do not cover the total costs of attending 
school, and students at for-profit institutions are more likely to take 
out private loans to cover the remaining cost.125 For-profit institutions 
themselves are increasingly likely to offer students loans after a 2008 
regulatory reform relaxed the 90/10 rule.126 
Large amounts of debt lead to poor student outcomes in two 
ways. First, even if a student’s earning power increases as a result of 
the degree, the student may not earn enough to repay his or her 
student loans. It is difficult to determine what proportion of for-profit 
college graduates are unable to find “gainful employment” or a use 
for their degree or certificate,127 but anecdotes of graduates who find 
that their degrees are formally128 or informally unrecognized by 
employers are common.129 According to one study, students of for-
profit institutions who dropped out are less likely to default on their 
loans than students who earn degrees, because so many graduates are 
 
 122. Id. at 3. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 6–7. 
 125. Id. at 4. 
 126. DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PILING IT ON: THE GROWTH OF 
PROPRIETARY SCHOOL LOANS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR STUDENTS 25–27 (2011). 
Institutional loans are no longer counted within the “90” part of the 90/10 rule’s calculation. 34 
C.F.R. § 668.28(a) (2012). 
 127. For an overview of the inadequacies of student-performance data collection and 
reporting, see LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 36–38. 
 128. When schools are sued for fraudulent recruitment tactics, the suits often concern a 
school’s lack of authority to confer required professional licensing. See, e.g., Class Action 
Complaint at 24–28, Montgomery v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 10CH50281 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
23, 2010) (No. 10CH50281), 2010 WL 4815908, ¶¶ 103–13 (alleging that Everest College 
recruited students for a Medical Assistant program without the accreditation required for 
students to obtain employment after graduation). 
 129. See, e.g., Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34,386, 34,386–87 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of 
Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 
30, 2012)) (discussing how, in addition to students who default on their loans, there is another 
sizeable cohort of students who experience significant financial burdens as a result of an 
education that did not help them advance in a career); see also Frontline: College, Inc., supra 
note 10 (sharing stories of students’ negative outcomes after attending for-profit institutions). 
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unable to pay their debt even if the degree increased their earning 
power.130 
Yet even the students who do drop out remain saddled with 
debt. Though graduation rates can vary dramatically from school to 
school, for-profit students graduate at far lower rates than their 
nonprofit counterparts.131 For example, the six-year graduation rate 
for bachelor’s degree students is 22 percent at four-year for-profit 
institutions, which is less than half of the rate at nonprofit 
institutions.132 For certain demographic groups, the outcomes at for-
profit schools are even more troubling. African-American students, 
for example, graduate half as often—at a rate of just 16 percent—at 
for-profit schools as they do at nonprofit schools.133 The data show 
that many for-profit schools, particularly the largest institutions, are 
churning students: in one year between 2008 and 2009, sixteen of the 
largest for-profit institutions’ four-year degree programs turned over 
more than 57 percent of their student body.134 
Students who attend for-profit schools are also more likely to 
default on loans than their nonprofit counterparts. The Department 
of Education estimates that students in two- and four-year programs 
at for-profit institutions are three times as likely to default over the 
lifetime of their federal Stafford loans compared to student borrowers 
as a whole.135 Even controlling for student demographics and income, 
students at for-profit schools are still significantly more likely to 
default than other students.136 In 2010, the two-year default rate for 
students at for-profit institutions was double that of students at 
nonprofit institutions.137 Default rates on institutional loans are nearly 
 
 130. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note 
76, at 11 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and 
Success). 
 131. Id. at 9–10. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. Id.  
 134. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 5 (2010). 
 135. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 10. 
 136. JONATHAN GURYAN & MATTHEW THOMPSON, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., REPORT 
ON GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT 15 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/oira_1840/1840_04232010-h.pdf. 
 137. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note 
76, at 7 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and 
Success). Students at for-profit institutions make up only 10 percent of the student population. 
Id. 
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50 percent at some for-profit schools,138 and losses from private loans 
grew so much that in 2008 some private lenders ceased lending to 
students at for-profit schools altogether.139 
The consequences to students of defaulting on a loan are severe. 
Federal student loans have some borrower-friendly protections built 
in—such as favorable interest rates and income-based repayment—
but they are nearly impossible to discharge in bankruptcy.140 
Defaulting on federal student loans leads to harsh sanctions, such as 
the garnishment of the student’s wages and ineligibility for student 
aid in the future.141 Private and institutional loans are even worse. 
They lack many of the federal loans’ consumer protections yet remain 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy, often with significantly higher rates 
and unfavorable terms.142 Because of these factors, one poor college-
borrowing decision can haunt a student for life.143 
Admittedly, education is difficult to measure and evaluate, and 
as for-profit educators stress, their schools teach in innovative ways 
that are even more difficult to assess, such as online-only education.144 
The for-profit sector, however, is results-oriented in a way traditional 
nonprofit higher education is not.145 Students at for-profit institutions 
are more interested in career advancement than in purely academic 
pursuits,146 and school recruitment tactics reflect this.147 It is 
 
 138. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 19. 
 139. Id. at 10–11. 
 140. See DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PAYING THE PRICE: THE HIGH 
COST OF PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS AND THE DANGERS FOR STUDENT BORROWERS 12–15 
(2008) (highlighting the differences between federal and private student loans). For an analysis 
of how even the law of student loan dischargeability itself leads to poor outcomes for students, 
see Amy E. Sparrow, Comment, Unduly Harsh: The Need To Examine Educational Value in 
Student Loan Discharge Cases Involving For-Profit Trade Schools, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 329 (2007). 
 141. Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra note 
76, at 2 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and 
Success). 
 142. See LOONIN, supra note 140, at 2–6 (outlining the dangers of private loans); LOONIN, 
supra note 126, at 2 (outlining the dangers of institutional loans). 
 143. See Daniel Golden, Homeless High School Dropouts Lured by For-Profit Colleges, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2010, 12:01 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-
30/homeless-dropouts-from-high-school-lured-by-for-profit-colleges-with-cash.html (“In the 
Cleveland shelters, you can still find people with trade school debts from 20 years ago.”). 
 144. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Ann I. Morey, Globalization and the Emergence of For-Profit Higher Education, 48 
HIGHER EDUC. 131, 143 (2004) (comparing for-profit institutions’ missions with those of liberal-
arts educators). 
 146. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate, therefore, to evaluate for-profit institutions based on 
student outcomes because the institutions themselves promise 
positive student outcomes. 
III.  FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW 
Federal student aid has fueled the success of for-profit 
institutions. This Part explains how Title IV has enabled the for-profit 
higher-education industry’s growth and, with it, the incidence of 
negative student outcomes. Section B examines why the surrounding 
legal and regulatory regime is unable to prevent those negative 
outcomes. 
A. The Impact of Title IV on For-Profit Institutions 
1. The For-Profit Business Model.  Throughout the 2000s, the 
Apollo Group, which is the parent company of the University of 
Phoenix, was an extremely profitable investment.148 But in 2005, 
shareholders sued the corporation for securities fraud, alleging that 
Apollo had failed to disclose a Department of Education report that 
found that the University of Phoenix had violated Title IV’s incentive 
compensation bans.149 The mere threat that Phoenix would become 
ineligible for Title IV funds was worth $277 million to the investors.150 
As noted earlier, tuition payments account for a significantly 
higher percentage of revenue at for-profit institutions than at 
nonprofit institutions.151 Federal student aid makes up a substantial 
portion of those tuition revenues. Federal aid, from all sources, makes 
 
 147. See Woods, supra note 109 (“The advisors almost always described the benefits of 
education in terms of future material rewards . . . .”). 
 148. For a discussion of Phoenix’s attractiveness to investors, see Andreas Ortmann, Capital 
Romance: Why Wall Street Fell in Love with Higher Education, in EARNINGS FROM LEARNING: 
THE RISE OF FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITIES, supra note 2, at 145. 
 149. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010); Doug 
Lederman, Jury Orders U. of Phoenix Parent To Pay $277 Million, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan. 17, 
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/17/apollo. 
 150. See Lead Plaintiff, the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago’s 
Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal Securities Laws at 11–12, In re 
Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731 (Lead Case No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT), 2005 
WL 6259503 (“Because for-profit secondary education providers . . . are so dependent on Title 
IV loan programs, any negative or potentially adverse news or announcements that might 
impact Title IV qualification . . . are important to reasonable investors and are material to the 
market.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 151. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
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up nearly 90 percent of the revenue for fourteen of the largest for-
profit institutions.152 In 2009, Title IV aid alone accounted for over 
three quarters of the overall revenue of the five largest for-profit 
schools.153 This degree of reliance on Title IV funds is characteristic of 
the for-profit sector. For-profit institutions enroll a tenth of all 
students in higher education and receive almost one quarter of all 
Title IV funds.154 
2. Title IV’s Role in Fueling Negative Student Outcomes.  
Reliance on tuition revenue, particularly Title IV student aid, helps to 
explain two noteworthy practices within the for-profit sector. First, 
the reliance on tuition revenue sheds some light on the intense 
recruiting focus of many for-profit institutions. Without other sources 
of revenue, enrollment growth is necessary for revenue growth.155 
Second, the fact that Title IV need-based aid has proved so lucrative 
illuminates why the student populations at for-profit institutions 
differ from those at nonprofit institutions. Students whom traditional 
institutions consider to be unqualified for admission are, for the most 
part, still eligible to borrow money to pay for an education at a for-
profit institution.156 The result is an industry full of institutions that 
are “built to swallow Title IV funds in the way a whale gathers up 
plankton.”157  
In some sense, this extensive recruiting activity by for-profit 
institutions serves the purposes of the HEA because the federal 
student-aid program looks to increase access to higher education.158 
More access is thought to be better, and it is imperative for 
historically underserved, low-income, and nontraditional students to 
pursue higher education.159 For-profit institutions have been 
 
 152. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON THE 
FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 10 (2010). 
 153. S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2010). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 85–88 (explaining pricing strategies at for-profit 
institutions). 
 156. See BERG, supra note 17, at 67 (“[T]he University of Phoenix . . . counters criticism of 
its open admissions policy with accusations of elitism. . . . [A]nyone who wants an education 
should be able to receive it.”). 
 157. Daniel Kruger, Blackboard Jungle, FORBES MAG., Dec. 13, 2004, at 118, 120. 
 158. See supra Part I.A. 
 159. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
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successful at expanding access to these populations.160 But access to 
higher education is not contemplated within the HEA as an end unto 
itself, but rather a means to increased student and societal welfare.161 
For many students at for-profit institutions, Title IV only mires them 
in debt.162 Even further, it appears that increased reliance on Title IV 
itself is strongly correlated with negative student outcomes in the for-
profit sector.163 How does Title IV turn access to higher education 
from an opportunity into a trap? 
Under Title IV, a school suffers few consequences for negative 
student outcomes.164 Students are responsible for paying their own 
debt and the government assumes the risk of default.165 This 
arrangement bears a strong resemblance to the subprime mortgage 
market, which flourished in the 2000s as many lenders avoided 
bearing the risk from their lending activities.166 Lenders in the 
subprime market profited by ignoring creditworthiness, increasing 
lending activity, and divesting themselves of the risk.167 Title IV funds 
are available to any student who has been admitted into an academic 
or vocational program. Economic tests for student creditworthiness 
were flatly rejected.168 In most other contexts, borrowers must pass 
some measure of creditworthiness, and it is in the lender’s best 
interest to lend only to worthy borrowers. Title IV encourages 
schools to accept many students who must then borrow significant 
 
 160. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part II.C. 
 163. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-103, PROPRIETARY SCHOOLS: 
POORER STUDENT OUTCOMES AT SCHOOLS THAT RELY MORE ON FEDERAL AID 3 (1997), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-97-103/pdf/GAOREPORTS
-HEHS-97-103.pdf. 
 164. Legal and regulatory devices meant to restrain school conduct are discussed infra Part 
III.B. 
 165. See supra notes 121–147 and accompanying text. 
 166. For a comparison between the current market for student loans and the subprime 
mortgage market, see LOONIN, supra note 140, at 6–9; compare Katherine Mangu-Ward, 
Education for Profit: Why Is Everyone Flaming the University of Phoenix?, REASON, July 2008, 
at 39, 40 (“As with subprimes, a nonnegligible portion of consumers won’t be able to stay afloat 
. . . . But the students who do graduate—like the millions who use subprime deals to gain a 
firmer foothold in the housing market—have a much different story to tell.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Martin F. Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the 
Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis, 157 DE ECONOMIST 129, 139–42, 146–47 (2009) (“The risks 
of [subprime] mortgage finance [were] thus transferred from the originating institution . . . .”). 
 168. See Glater, supra note 20, at 12 n.1 (citing one senator’s belief that an “economic test” 
of creditworthiness would impose “an ever greater obstacle to higher education as rising prices 
ma[k]e paying for college more challenging”). 
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sums to attend, even if the schools would never lend to the students 
themselves.169 
For a profit-maximizing institution, Title IV sets up a system of 
perverse incentives. When a student takes out tens of thousands of 
dollars in debt and receives little value in return, both the student and 
the government are worse for the exchange, but the school keeps its 
tuition dollars. When a student enrolls and receives a Pell Grant, only 
to drop out after a few months, the student is somewhat worse off—
having exhausted his or her Pell Grant, which could have been 
applied toward a future educational venture—but the government has 
spent thousands of dollars with very little return, and the school has 
received free money. Indeed, a for-profit institution earns its profits 
by minimizing per-student expenditures and by maximizing student 
debt. Because the students’ debt is owed to the government or private 
lenders, rather than to the school, many schools have little stake in 
their students’ outcomes. 
3. Inadequacies of the Market Model for Higher Education.  
Those within the for-profit higher-education industry believe that 
market pressures mitigate Title IV’s perverse incentives.170 This 
argument can be articulated in two ways. One view is that the student 
consumers can and will differentiate between high- and low-quality 
institutions, weeding out institutions that fail to deliver value to 
students.171 The other view is that the marketplace merely reflects 
consumer preferences, for better or for worse—that successful for-
profit schools are merely delivering what consumers demand.172 
The former explanation is incorrect, the latter, irrelevant. First, 
students are not, in fact, able to evaluate accurately the quality of an 
educational institution before enrollment.173 Information asymmetries 
plague the enrollment process, and students simply cannot obtain the 
data they would require to evaluate rigorously many for-profit 
 
 169. The existence of a burgeoning institutional-loan market does not contradict this 
statement. As discussed infra Part III.B.2, institutional loans are likely viewed as loss leaders 
that allow schools to preserve their 90-10 eligibility. 
 170. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 140–43 (naming the marketplace as a “guardian of 
institutional quality and integrity”). 
 171. See Breneman, supra note 61, at 89 (“[A]n institution such as the University of Phoenix 
has a huge stake in building and sustaining its reputation for quality, and . . . short-run profit 
maximization . . . runs contrary to long-run profit maximization linked to reputation.”). 
 172. RUCH, supra note 63, at 144. 
 173. Pusser, supra note 13, at 32–33. 
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schools based on clear, objective criteria such as job placement or 
completion numbers.174 The available data are often flawed or 
unintelligible.175 Furthermore, many individuals recruited by for-profit 
colleges are unfamiliar with the market for higher education and may 
be easily swayed by a relentless aspirational campaign about their 
educational investment—particularly when the federal government 
will be providing generous assistance.176 
Second, massive federal intervention has already skewed the 
market for higher education. The entire purpose of Title IV is to use 
government aid to increase consumer demand for higher education.177 
Indeed, for-profit institutions receive such a high percentage of 
tuition revenue from Title IV that government intervention—not any 
inherent demand on the part of students—may be the prime mover in 
the story of enrollment successes at many for-profit institutions.178 
When a government program drives consumer behavior, merely 
positing that the market reflects consumer demand does not answer 
the question of whether the market prevents misuses of that 
government program. Surely Congress, when it enacted the HEA, did 
not intend for Title IV to leave students worse off.179 
Furthermore, evidence suggests that the market for higher 
education, propelled by Title IV portable-student subsidies, may play 
a role in decreasing overall student welfare by leading to higher 
prices. Because consumers are unable to evaluate institutions 
accurately, students turn to secondary indicators of quality such as 
prestige.180 But prestige is expensive to generate and maintain.181 
 
 174. See LOONIN & DEVANTHÉRY, supra note 104, at 28–29 (“No admissions representative 
gave official completion rate statistics. . . . Job placement rates were equally difficult to obtain. 
Most admissions officers would not give placement in the form of a rate.”). For this study, the 
authors attempted, often unsuccessfully, to obtain job-placement and completion-rate 
information from schools and the federal and state regulatory bodies and accreditation agencies. 
Id. at 27. 
 175. Id. at 35–39. 
 176. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 
34,456 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector 
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012)) 
(“Students . . . often have limited information, little or no experience choosing [schools], and 
asymmetric information . . . . [T]hese gaps in information sometimes lead to students and their 
families making suboptimal choices. . . .”). 
 177. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 150, 152–154 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 180. Dill, supra note 36, at 146–47. 
 181. Id. at 152–53. 
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Indeed, this dynamic may be responsible for the steady rise in the 
price of education at nonprofit institutions.182 In this respect, enabling 
the student as a consumer could lead to students, as a group, being 
worse off than otherwise. This is not to say that the market has no 
value in sorting student consumers across the higher-education 
landscape. Rather, the market simply does not sufficiently constrain 
the conduct of for-profit institutions in a way that would satisfactorily 
prevent negative student outcomes and abuse of the Title IV 
program. 
B.  The Inadequacy of Available Legal Tools in Preventing Negative 
Student Outcomes 
To date, the Title IV regulatory regime has failed to prevent for-
profit institutions from turning the program from an opportunity into 
a trap. Individual students find that litigation provides redress in only 
the most outrageous cases, because only a small portion of negative 
student outcomes arise from clearly illegal conduct. Regulatory 
devices meant to prevent abuse of Title IV have proven themselves 
ineffective or easily evaded. And industry oversight, a keystone of the 
Title IV regulatory triad, is not up to the task demanded of it. 
1. Student Litigation Options and the Legality of a Bad Deal.  A 
variety of litigation options exist for students who find themselves 
worse off after their experiences with for-profit institutions. Suits for 
fraudulent misrepresentations during the recruitment process are the 
most common and fruitful option for potential litigants.183 In certain 
cases, such as when recruiters make “specific and isolated” 
representations that are easily proven as false and material, such as 
accreditation or licensing status, fraud litigation can be an effective 
tool for redress.184 
Even the most ardent skeptics of the for-profit higher-education 
industry, however, would concede that a great deal of negative 
student outcomes do not implicate recruiting fraud. Getting a bad 
 
 182. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 86 (“[C]ompetition among non-profit institutions . . . has 
fueled the creation of costly amenities . . . which may have little to do . . . with the quality of 
education.”). 
 183. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 766 (explaining why fraudulent-misrepresentation suits 
are “appealing weapons” in comparison to less frequently used litigation tools for addressing 
negative student outcomes at for-profit schools). 
 184. Id. 
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deal is problematic, but not unlawful.185 Nor should the courts be in 
the business of investigating the wisdom of individual student debt 
loads or choices to attend schools that are more expensive than 
alternatives,186 particularly when so many burdensome debts would 
not have been possible without federal intervention in the first 
place.187 
That said, it is worth asking whether courts do, in fact, protect 
against deceitful conduct. Misrepresentations go unpunished because 
of the sheer number of variables that interact with a student on his or 
her path from recruitment to default.188 This uncertainty undermines 
virtually every prong of a plaintiff’s fraud case, from falsity189 to 
scienter190 to reliance191 to causation.192 Fraud doctrine, therefore, 
would appear to do very little to rein in schools’ recruiting behavior. 
2. Shortcomings of Title IV Regulatory Devices.  With so many 
for-profit institutions reliant on Title IV as a revenue source, the 
threat to revoke an institution’s eligibility to receive funds through 
the program might seem excessively forceful.193 However, the 
regulatory regime has failed to prevent Title IV from facilitating 
negative student outcomes. The strings attached to eligibility are too 
weak to serve their intended purpose. 
Regulating the cohort default rate might seem to be the 
regulatory device most tailored to the problems at hand, because it 
 
 185. Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. 
Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012) (attempting to hold for-
profit institutions accountable for negative student outcomes through the gainful employment 
rule). 
 186. This view is reflected by the “academic abstention” doctrine, whereby courts generally 
steer clear of qualitative judgments of educational institutions. Linehan, supra note 42, at 764–
65. 
 187. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON 
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 11–12 
(2010) (bemoaning the role federal dollars play in fueling burdensome debts). 
 188. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 768 (noting the impact of “student ability, labor demand, 
[and] other factors outside the control of the school”). 
 189. See id. at 767 (“[F]orward-looking statements that rely on factors outside the school’s 
control lack . . . the requisite degree of falsity . . . .”). 
 190. See Taylor, supra note 33, at 764 (“[P]roprietary schools are able to hide behind the fact 
that much of what determines a graduate’s job prospects is outside of the school’s control.”). 
 191. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 768 (“[I]t is generally recognized that one does not have 
the right to rely on statements that are predictive of the future.”). 
 192. See id. at 769 (noting “courts’ concern about their own inability to discern a causal link 
between the student’s failure to learn and the school’s educational program”). 
 193. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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directly measures student outcomes. A school loses eligibility to 
receive Title IV funds if, for three consecutive years, more than 25 
percent of its students default on certain federal student loans within 
two years of the time when the students began repayment, or if 
during any single year more than 40 percent of a student cohort 
defaults.194 Most students are granted a six-month grace period after 
graduation or withdrawal before making payments on their loans, and 
it takes between 270 and 360 additional days of nonpayment before a 
student is considered in default.195 Because of additional procedural 
requirements, “[i]t takes about 600 days for a borrower to default on 
a [Title IV] loan after the student ends attendance.”196 Additionally, 
many students in financial trouble are eligible for payment 
postponement measures, including deferrals based upon financial 
hardship.197 A student who passes through the cohort window while in 
deferment is not counted as having defaulted, even if the student 
defaults immediately upon the expiration of the deferral.198 
With such a brief window within which a student could default 
for the purposes of the cohort default rule, it is a wonder that any 
schools ever fail this measure. It seems sensible to cap measures of 
the cohort default rate after some time. As time passes, the school’s 
effect on the student’s outcome is outweighed by a variety of 
intervening factors. Too-stringent cohort default-rate calculations 
would also discourage schools from admitting low-income students or 
other students from populations associated with higher default rates. 
However, two- or three-year rate calculations are far too narrow to 
have any impact on preventing negative student outcomes when 
defaults are so much higher over the lifetime of the loan.199 It even 
appears that because the short measurements offer such little time for 
 
 194. 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.183, 668.187 (2012). For loans originating after 2009, the cohort 
default rate is calculated with a three-year rather than a two-year window. Id. §§ 668.200–02. 
 195. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A02H0007, FINAL AUDIT 
REPORT: TECHNICAL CAREER INSTITUTES, INC.’S ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL PELL 
GRANT AND FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAMS 7 n.6 (2008), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2008/a02h0007.pdf. 
 196. Id. at 7. 
 197. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.204 (outlining procedures for financial hardship deferment). 
 198. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 244 (explaining deferment and forbearance exclusions to 
the default rate calculation). 
 199. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: 
AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN 
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (2010) (“[D]efault rates . . . do not fully capture students 
who default. . . .”). 
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students to default, many colleges can successfully delay default until 
after the period ends.200 Ultimately, it is necessary to circumscribe the 
cohort default calculation, excluding many defaults out of fairness to 
the school, which highlights the limited utility of using cohort default 
rates as a method of reducing negative student outcomes. Even the 
Department of Education has conceded that the cohort default rate is 
a better measure of loss to taxpayers than of harm to students.201 
The 90/10 rule is another major regulatory condition that is both 
lenient and easily avoided. Unlike the cohort default rate regulations, 
the 90/10 rule focuses on inputs rather than outputs. Because an 
institution’s greater reliance on federal student aid is associated with 
poorer student outcomes,202 the rule attempts to ensure that a school 
offers an education of sufficient quality to attract funds independent 
of those guaranteed by the federal government.203 
Stated simply, the 90/10 rule requires that a for-profit institution 
receive more than 10 percent of its revenue from sources other than 
Title IV student aid.204 Many sources of student aid can satisfy the 10 
percent requirement, including veterans’ benefits or institutional 
loans.205 Compelling justifications exist for excluding each of these 
revenue sources from the 90-percent calculation.206 In the aggregate, 
though, they allow schools to receive virtually all of their revenue 
from government yet remain in compliance.207 This arrangement not 
only undermines the 90/10 rule itself, because an institution that 
obtains 93 percent of its revenue from the government, albeit 
indirectly, through students’ tuition payments, has clearly not 
 
 200. See Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at For-Profit Colleges, supra 
note 76, at 9 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, Institute for College Access and 
Success) (“[C]olleges kept defaults down during, but not after, the period in which they were 
being tracked . . . .”). 
 201. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 34,411 
(June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. 
& Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012)). 
 202. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 163, at 3. 
 203. LOONIN, supra note 126, at 25. 
 204. 34 C.F.R. § 668.28 (2012). 
 205. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 206. For example, the Department of Education understandably would not want to make a 
school choose between accepting the federal student aid for a low-income student receiving 
Title IV funds and that of a combat veteran receiving veterans’ benefits. 
 207. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., THE RETURN ON 
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT IN FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION: DEBT WITHOUT A DIPLOMA 10 
(2010) (observing that one for-profit institution received 93.1 percent of its revenue from the 
federal government).  
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obtained independence from government funding. But it threatens 
the integrity of programs such as the veterans’ benefit programs that 
may be used to satisfy the 10-percent requirement but that are, 
nonetheless, federal funding.208 When a school’s revenue balance 
begins to approach the 90-percent threshold, every dollar collected 
from a 10-percent source becomes immensely valuable. One veterans’ 
benefits dollar allows a school to collect nine more Title IV dollars 
that they otherwise would have been barred from receiving, thus 
illuminating perhaps the best explanation for why veterans are so 
heavily recruited by for-profit schools.209 These funding rules also 
explain why many for-profit schools seem ambivalent about 
outrageous write-off rates on their own institutional loans. 
Institutional loans can be viewed as “loss leaders” because they allow 
schools to expand their Title IV collection activities.210 
The cohort default rate and the 90/10 rules are the two federal 
regulations that do the most work ensuring positive student outcomes 
within the Title IV aid program.211 Other rules, such as the ban on 
incentive payments for recruiters,212 are tailored more toward curbing 
fraud than preventing students from receiving a bad deal. Similarly, 
state oversight of for-profit schools tends not to address negative 
outcomes enabled by the Title IV program, because states have 
relatively little interest in the success or failure of Title IV.213 Finally, 
 
 208. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., BENEFITTING 
WHOM? FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION COMPANIES AND THE GROWTH OF MILITARY 
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS 4 (2010) (“Congress may have unintentionally subjected this new 
generation of veterans to the worst excesses of the for-profit industry . . . .”).  
 209. More than one-third of payments from the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2357 (2008) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 16132a, 16163a, 38 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3311–3324 (Supp. IV 2011)), went to students at for-profit 
institutions in the program’s first year, Drowning in Debt: Financial Outcomes of Students at 
For-Profit Colleges, supra note 76, at 13 (statement of Pauline Abernathy, Vice President, 
Institute for College Access and Success). 
 210. See LOONIN, supra note 126, at 28 (noting one for-profit institution’s begrudging 
acceptance of a loss of $75 million in private student loans). 
 211. See supra notes 50–55, 199–216 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Linehan, supra note 42, at 782 (“[T]he states have relatively little to lose from 
student loan default resulting from proprietary schools’ predatory practices . . . .”); see also 
Improving For-Profit Higher Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of 
Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American Association of Collegiate 
Registrars and Admissions Officers), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Nassirian.pdf (“[S]tates have none of their own resources at risk, [and] they have no 
particular . . . incentive to engage in meaningful oversight . . . .”). 
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it is unclear what impact the Department of Education’s new gainful 
employment rules214 would have had on reducing negative student 
outcomes enabled by Title IV.215 An extra set of performance 
standards could have provided students with welcome safeguards, but 
many critics suggested that the final language of the regulations was 
too weak to make a difference.216 
3. The Inherent Limits of Industry Sanctions.  Higher education 
has traditionally been a self-regulated field.217 Norms and tradition 
inform many practices within the industry, including the dominance 
of the nonprofit form.218 Accreditation served as a form of industry 
self-regulation long before it was incorporated into the federal 
regulatory structure.219 Federal authority was first delegated to 
accreditors in 1952, in an amendment to the G.I. Bill.220 
Within the regulatory triad, questions about the efficacy and 
value of academic programs or institutions are left to professional 
educators.221 Given federal and state governments’ great reluctance to 
qualitatively evaluate academic institutions, accreditation would seem 
an appropriate venue for ensuring positive student outcomes. In 
theory, Title IV access is only awarded to institutions that have been 
judged by experts and peers to deliver a satisfactory educational 
 
 214. 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 
681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012). As noted supra note 59, it is possible that upon remand or 
through further rulemaking, the Department of Education reinstates the substance of the 
gainful employment rules. 
 215. See Michael Stratford, 193 Vocational Programs, All at For-Profits, Fail ‘Gainful 
Employment’ Test, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 6, 2012, at A14 (noting that when the 
Department of Education assessed for-profit institutions’ compliance with the gainful 
employment rules before the rules were to go into effect, about 5 percent of programs at for-
profit institutions would have been rendered ineligible for federal student aid). 
 216. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 261 (characterizing the rule as “a case of shockingly 
low expectations”). Perhaps more important is the dilemma outlined infra Part IV.C. If the rule 
had been truly successful at preventing poor outcomes, it would almost certainly have done so 
by sacrificing access to higher education, thereby limiting the positive impacts of Title IV. 
 217. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 24 (noting the peculiarity of an industry dominated by 
nonprofit institutions); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 219. KINSER, supra note 22, at 100. 
 220. Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, ch. 875, pt. VI, § 253(a)(1), 66 Stat. 
663, 675, replaced by Veterans’ Benefits, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958) (codified as 
amended at 38 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 221. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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product.222 In practice, higher academic self-regulation fails to offer 
the scrutiny that would be required to prevent negative student 
outcomes at any significant level. 
Accreditation fails to give for-profit institutions a sufficiently 
close look for three reasons. First, national accrediting agencies 
provide the requisite approval for most for-profit schools.223 These 
agencies are more diffuse and have fewer resources than the six main 
regional accreditors, and their standards are generally considered 
lower because they operate on a smaller scale,224 providing 
accreditation to career-oriented programs rather than institutions.225 
Accreditors with less administrative capability often appear to 
operate under a presumption to grant accreditation.226 For an 
institution that treats accreditation as merely a business objective,227 
these national accrediting organizations are very appealing. 
Second, regional accrediting organizations are known for more 
stringent standards,228 but they have found it difficult to assess for-
profit institutions that disregard the norms of traditional higher 
education.229 For-profit institutions are industry rogues.230 They treat 
faculty as contractors, removing them from the administrative process 
and curriculum development.231 They treat education as a commodity 
with little inherent value.232 They standardize curricula and ignore the 
 
 222. See Bridgepoint Education, Inc.: A Case Study in For-Profit Higher Education: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of 
Sylvia Manning, President, Higher Learning Commission, North Central Association of 
Colleges and Schools), available at http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Manning.pdf (“[T]o 
assess academic quality at the level of higher education, you need the authority of professional 
experience and current knowledge.”). 
 223. KINSER, supra note 22, at 106. 
 224. See Improving For-Profit Higher Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy 
Solutions, supra note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, 
American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers) (explaining the 
practical difficulties in enforcing high standards for accreditors lacking in resources). 
 225. KINSER, supra note 22, at 98. 
 226. See id. at 3 (“Accrediting bodies have strong financial, political, and legal incentives to 
approve even the most questionable applicants.”). 
 227. RUCH, supra note 78, at 141. 
 228. See, e.g., KINSER, supra note 22, at 99 (“[R]egional accreditation has been traditionally 
perceived as an indication of quality and status.” (citation omitted)). 
 229. Id. at 108–110. 
 230. See BERG, supra note 17, at 93–106 (describing “for-profit university culture”). 
 231. See, e.g., Breneman, supra note 61, at 85–86 (detailing this phenomenon at the 
University of Phoenix). 
 232. Cf. RUCH, supra note 63, at 18 (“The generation, dissemination, and advancement of 
knowledge are core values that are . . . more or less woven into the mission statement of 
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traditional academic calendar.233 They install “campuses” in office 
parks around the country rather than in one single location, or in the 
case of some online schools, they have no campuses at all.234 They 
have fundamentally different goals than traditional higher-education 
institutions, being neither philanthropic nor prestige-seeking.235 
Having moved past a time when for-profit institutions were 
categorically excluded from regional accrediting status,236 accreditors 
have largely responded to the paradigm-shifting nature of for-profit 
institutions by holding fast to formalist requirements, such as 
mandating installation of hard-copy libraries.237 Regional accreditors 
also struggle with evaluating institutions based in their region but 
with fundamentally national operations.238 
Third, the accreditation process is vulnerable to capture, due to 
the fact that the enormously valuable Title IV funds are only 
available to accredited institutions.239 For-profit institutions have 
purchased entire colleges to piggyback on the college’s accreditation, 
dramatically expanding the old school’s “existing” programs rather 
than starting from scratch and going through the accreditation 
process.240 With so much at stake, considerable pressure is exerted 
upon accrediting agencies, which are financially dependent on their 
institutional members and whose officers are largely drawn from the 
 
virtually every respectable, traditional academic institution. Even for-profit providers do not 
totally ignore these values, for they are more or less built into accreditation and state licensing 
standards.”). 
 233. Many for-profit institutions eschew the semester format for a schedule in which 
students take one intensive five-week course at a time. E.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra 
note 57, at 1. 
 234. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 44 (describing a typical campus of Strayer University). 
 235. See id. at 16 (“The non-profits are driven by . . . the prestige motive, as opposed to the 
profit motive on the for-profit side.”). 
 236. KINSER, supra note 22, at 102–03. 
 237. See RUCH, supra note 63, at 41 (confessing that most of DeVry University’s library 
investments were only made because of accreditation directives). 
 238. KINSER, supra note 22, at 108–10. 
 239. See Improving For-Profit Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions, 
supra note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American 
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers) (“[A]ccreditation is dominated 
by the very entities that it is supposed to oversee.”). 
 240.  S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-
PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 2–3 (2010). Accreditors have begun to crack down on this 
behavior. Bridgepoint Education, Inc.: A Case Study in For-Profit Higher Education, supra note 
222, at 3 (statement of Sylvia Manning, President, Higher Learning Commission, North Central 
Association of Colleges and Schools). 
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institutions they oversee.241 Further, accreditors themselves continue 
to insist that their role is to evaluate educational institutions as 
educators, not to uphold the integrity of the Title IV system.242  
IV.  SOLVING TITLE IV: A CONTINUUM OF APPROACHES 
If Title IV encourages the negative outcomes suffered by many 
students at for-profit schools, what can be done? This Part examines a 
variety of broad approaches to reducing negative student outcomes. 
These approaches differ based on their hostility toward the for-profit 
higher-education sector in an attempt to reduce negative student 
outcomes at those institutions. Ultimately, however, it is difficult to 
envision an approach working within Title IV that solves the 
problems posed by negative student outcomes at for-profit 
institutions to a satisfactory degree while still advancing the HEA’s 
worthwhile goals. 
A.  Eliminate Federal Student Aid Eligibility of For-Profit Institutions 
Participation by the for-profit sector in the Title IV student-aid 
program is certainly not a given; it took for-profit institutions seven 
years to be allowed into the program.243 To combat negative outcomes 
associated with the for-profit sector, then, singling out the for-profit 
sector for the purposes of Title IV might seem to be a logical 
approach for policymakers. This approach could take many forms: 
Congress could simply return to the 1965 formulation of Title IV in 
which the for-profit sector is categorically excluded,244 or Congress or 
the Department of Education could implement onerous measures 
singling out for-profit institutions for special treatment to exclude the 
industry de facto. 
The argument for such an approach is straightforward. There are 
significant differences between for-profit institutions and the rest of 
the higher-education industry.245 Some commentators argue that the 
profit motive is totally or to a large degree incompatible with the 
HEA’s desire to increase the creation of a public good, particularly 
 
 241. Improving For-Profit Education: A Roundtable Discussion of Policy Solutions, supra 
note 213, at 2 (statement of Barmak Nassirian, Associate Executive Director, American 
Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers). 
 242. ABUSES IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID PROGRAMS, S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 17–18 (1991). 
 243. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 230–235 and accompanying text. 
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when such a thriving nonprofit cohort—with philanthropic goals 
generally aligned with those outlined in the HEA—already dominates 
the field.246 Indeed, extinguishing the private, for-profit sector would 
result in a higher-education industry that more resembles its 
traditional state, in which for-profit institutions played a much smaller 
role.247 
Plus, for-profit institutions are already singled out for special 
treatment under Title IV. As noted earlier, they were excluded 
entirely under the original version of the HEA.248 Many of the Title 
IV regulations apply to the for-profit sector only, such as the “gainful 
employment” language in the 1972 amendments, their accompanying 
rulemaking, and the 90/10 rule.249 Even nonprofit career colleges, 
which use ostensibly the same employment-focused educational 
approach as many for-profit institutions, are not legally required to 
prepare students for “gainful employment in a recognized 
occupation” in the way for-profit institutions are.250 
This categorical approach, however, is shortsighted—in addition 
to being a political non-starter.251 For-profit institutions surely create 
some social good. They offer education to populations that remain 
underserved by traditional higher-education institutions,252 
particularly as public funding for public universities and community 
colleges continues to plummet.253 Further, because of the sheer 
number of schools within the industry and their great heterogeneity, 
there must be a large coterie of schools that does not contribute 
disproportionally to negative student outcomes. To the extent they 
 
 246. See S. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., 112TH CONG., EMERGING RISK?: 
AN OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN 
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION 1 (2010) (“[E]ach corporation must act in the interest of its 
shareholders. However, this imperative could conflict with the objective of Federal student aid 
programs . . . .”). 
 247. See, e.g., KINSER, supra note 22, at 23 (“Unlike [in] some earlier periods . . . there 
seems to be little doubt of the for-profit sector’s survival.”). 
 248. See supra note 23. 
 249. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
 250. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (drawing a distinction between 
traditional higher-education institutions and for-profit institutions); see also 34 C.F.R. 
§668.28(a)(1) (2012) (applying the 90/10 rule only to for-profit institutions). 
 251. See Sam Dillon, Online Colleges Receive a Boost from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2006, at A1 (“[For-profits] have a full-blown lobbying effort and give lots of money to 
campaigns. In 10 years, the power of this interest group has spiked as much as any you’ll find.” 
(quoting Rep. Michael N. Castle) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 252. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 88. 
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could be categorized as such, and this Note does not attempt to do so, 
excluding these “good” for-profit schools would only hurt students by 
reducing access without a corresponding reduction in negative 
outcomes. It is not even clear that the for-profit motive is actually 
incongruous with Title IV. After all, the HEA seeks to expand access 
to education to the broadest extent, particularly with regard to the 
very low-income, minority, or nontraditional students served 
disproportionately by for-profit institutions.254 
For its boldness, such an approach would also be an 
underinclusive attempt to reduce negative student outcomes in higher 
education. Though students from for-profit institutions are 
responsible for a disproportionate number of Title IV loan defaults, 
for example, those students still represent less than half of the total 
number of overall defaults.255 The lack of a profit motive has not 
stopped nonprofit institutions from steadily and dramatically 
increasing their own tuition prices over the last few decades.256 What 
nonprofit institutions forego in profit they appear to make up for in 
inefficiency, often at the student’s expense.257 Nonprofit institutions 
also must deal with their own issues of institutional priorities and 
often find themselves working to increase their own prestige through 
measures unrelated to academic value.258 
B.  Reduce Access to Federal Student Aid 
The approach at the other end of the spectrum treats for-profit 
and nonprofit institutions equally. If Title IV is truly fueling the 
negative student outcomes caused by for-profit schools, but if 
categorically excluding for-profit schools from the program is unwise 
or unpalatable, then it is Title IV itself that requires a second look. 
Under this approach, Congress could seek to reduce Title IV’s 
capability to fuel negative student outcomes by reducing the federal 
investment in expanding access to education. This could be done by 
decreasing the amount of credit offered through the program or by 
implementing stronger gatekeeping measures to assess student 
 
 254. See supra notes 3–4, 8, 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 257. See RUCH, supra note 78, at 93 (positing that administrators at nonprofit institutions 
have “little or no financial incentive to increase operating efficiency . . . [and are] confronted 
with a significant disincentive to generate savings”). 
 258. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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creditworthiness before allowing them to borrow or otherwise receive 
aid. 
If too much student access to credit were the problem, this 
approach solves it. At some point, credit offered for an education—
and by extension, the educational opportunity the credit unlocks—
simply may not put students in a position to succeed. No education at 
all might be better than a poor or incomplete one fueled by excessive 
debt. If a student is unable to extract sufficient value from the point 
of their enrollment forward, it serves neither the student nor society 
to allow that student to borrow against his or her own future. Some 
might argue that it is simply naïve to assume that all students are an 
appropriate fit for higher education, and that the current level of 
access to federal aid merely creates a market for subprime 
education.259 
Though this Note does suggest that the Title IV program lies at 
the heart of many negative student outcomes,260 the cure offered by 
this approach is worse than the disease. First, erecting barriers of 
creditworthiness to Title IV aid would result in a dramatic reduction 
in aid for the neediest students. A relatively small deemphasis on 
grant- and loan-based aid in favor of deductible tax credits has 
already had the effect of reducing access for the poor in favor of 
greater affordability to the middle class.261 The same effect can be 
observed when need-based aid becomes merit-based.262 Conditioning 
Title IV aid on creditworthiness—assessed via measures of prior 
academic performance, or even a student’s assets—will almost 
certainly have the same effect. 
An across-the-board reduction in availability of grant- or loan-
based aid will result in great reductions in access to higher education, 
resulting in otherwise-worthy students missing out on the opportunity 
for an education. Reducing aid to students would also lead to worse 
outcomes for those students who are not deterred from pursuing an 
education despite the reduced level of aid. Private loans, after all, are 
available and sometimes necessary for students even under the 
current system, and their higher interest rates and lack of favorable 
 
 259. For an extensive comparison between the subprime mortgage market and the student 
loan “push market,” see LOONIN, supra note 140, at 33–43. 
 260. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 261. JAMES B. STEDMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB10097, THE HIGHER EDUCATION 
ACT: REAUTHORIZATION STATUS AND ISSUES 7 (2004). 
 262. Pusser, supra note 13, at 28. 
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federal-aid protections cause greater pain than Title IV loans if the 
student’s investment proves to be unwise.263 
This approach would represent an abandonment of the principles 
that underlie the HEA. Reducing access to credit, without some 
countervailing means of support, may indeed protect the public and 
save some students from themselves, but it would come at a 
significant cost: closing the “door to knowledge” for many 
Americans, including significant populations of low-income, minority, 
and nontraditional students.264 
C.  Strengthen the Title IV Regulatory Regime 
The inadequacy of the regulatory regime responsible for guiding 
Title IV presents an opportunity to solve the problems associated 
with for-profit institutions and Title IV without sacrificing the goals of 
the program or categorically excluding the for-profit sector.265 
Expanding the time period for cohort default rates and taking steps to 
include students in deferment and forbearance would keep many 
schools more cognizant of student financial outcomes.266 Reducing the 
90/10 ratio or eliminating some of its exceptions would diminish the 
concern that high levels of institutional dependency on federal aid 
lead to worse student outcomes.267 Strengthening borrower 
protections on student loans could mitigate the effects of an 
educational investment gone sour.268 
The new gainful-employment rules were the Department of 
Education’s most ambitious attempt to curb negative student 
outcomes at for-profit schools. Drawing from statutory language that 
had little effect for decades,269 the rules acknowledged the inadequacy 
of the previous Title IV framework.270 The rules addressed many of 
the practices responsible for negative student outcomes: disclosure of 
 
 263. See LOONIN, supra note 140, at 12, 18 (outlining the key differences between federal 
and private students loans and discussing the reasons why students turn to private loans). 
 264. Cf. Johnson, supra note 4 (emphasizing the government’s goal of expanding access to 
higher education). 
 265. See supra Part III.B. 
 266. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 202–210 and accompanying text. 
 268. Cf. supra note 140. 
 269. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Program Integrity: Gainful Employment—Debt Measures, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 
34,454 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.7 (2011), vacated by Ass’n of Private Sector 
Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, No. 11-1314 (RC), 2012 WL 20505237 (D.D.C. June 30, 2012)). 
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key performance information would have helped students evaluate 
institutions that recruit them, and the job-placement and debt-
repayment measures would have, at least to some degree, tied a 
school’s financial future to the well-being of its students.271 The rule’s 
original draft was even more potent, with less-forgiving standards 
placed upon schools and a “tiered” system of Title IV eligibility that 
would have allowed the government to restrict aid received by 
schools that underperform clearly, but not flagrantly.272 
The gainful-employment rule represented a positive sign to many 
commentators who have clamored for a regulatory approach aimed 
directly at reducing negative student outcomes in the for-profit 
sector.273 The history of Title IV regulation shows that measures such 
as this can indeed have some impact. After the implementation of the 
cohort default rate and the 90/10 rules in the early 1990s, many of the 
worst-offending schools were driven out of business and student 
defaults declined.274 
But these regulatory tweaks—including even the strongest 
iteration of the gainful employment rule—do not and cannot address 
the structural issues inherent within the Title IV program. 
Regulations that would significantly decrease negative student 
outcomes enabled by Title IV, such as an iteration of the 90/10 rule 
under which a school could only derive 45 percent of its revenues 
from Title IV, would likely have the effect of reducing access.275 
Regulations that seek to curb negative outcomes without conceding 
any student access will resemble the current cohort default rate and 
90/10 rules: easy to game for a minimally sophisticated actor.276 It is a 
worthy endeavor to increase the likelihood a career-oriented school 
prepares its students for gainful employment, but these measures 
cannot themselves resolve the Title IV tug-of-war between stopping 
 
 271. See id. at 34,456 (noting a “failure to align institutional incentives with student success” 
and enacting rules that “ensure that institutions consider the affordability of [their students’] 
loans”). 
 272. Id. at 34,388. 
 273. See, e.g., Fawn Johnson, Gainful Employment Rule: What Do We Think?, NAT’L J. 
EDUC. EXPERTS BLOG (June 6, 2011, 9:10 AM), http://education.nationaljournal.com/2011/06/
gainfulemployment-rule-what-do.php (“[T]he gainful-employment rule opens new possibilities 
for regulation . . . .”). 
 274. KINSER, supra note 22, at 118; see also supra note 215. 
 275. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 163, at 9–10 (suggesting a higher 
threshold but noting that such a revised rule would decrease access). 
 276. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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the law from enabling negative student outcomes and cutting off 
access. 
D.  The Public-Supply Model: A Way Around the Inherent Tensions 
of Title IV 
Is the answer, then, that the negative outcomes that arise from 
for-profit colleges are simply a tradeoff inherent within Title IV’s 
objective of expanding access to higher education? Thankfully, the 
answer is no. This tension is unavoidable within the portable-subsidy 
student-aid model that Title IV establishes as the federal 
government’s primary method of expanding access to higher 
education. The public-supply model, however, offers an alternative. 
To summarize, Title IV seeks to expand access to higher 
education by using the portable-subsidy model, which offers grants 
and favorable loans to defray a student’s cost of attendance.277 By 
contrast, the public-supply model expands access to higher education 
through direct investments in public institutions with the goal of 
reducing tuition prices. The public-supply model traditionally has 
involved states investing in their own public institutions.278 As state 
funding for institutions declines, however, federal student aid through 
Title IV assumes an increasingly prominent role in the quest to 
expand educational access.279 
An approach based on refocusing the federal government’s 
student-aid policy on public support instead of student subsidies 
satisfies many of the objections to the three rejected approaches 
above. Categorically excluding for-profit universities from Title IV is 
a poor solution because it will sharply reduce access to career-
oriented higher education.280 It also unfairly shuts down those for-
profit institutions that do not disproportionately contribute to 
negative student outcomes while leaving untouched a much larger 
industry group—nonprofit institutions—which still produce negative 
student outcomes in great numbers.281 However, by deemphasizing 
Title IV funding in favor of tuition reductions at community colleges 
 
 277. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 278. See Pusser, supra note 18, at 38–39 (noting increases in educational costs following a 
gradual policy shift away from a public-support model); see also Dill, supra note 36, at 142 
(discussing how the market for higher education can increase the cost of education). 
 279. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra Part IV.A. 
 281. See supra Part IV.A. 
MCGUIRE IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/2012  1:49 PM 
2012] SUBPRIME EDUCATION 159 
and state universities, the public-supply approach would diminish the 
role of for-profit institutions without decreasing overall access to 
higher education and without categorically excluding the for-profit 
sector. 
Blunting the impact of Title IV by making credit less available to 
students would be similarly misguided.282 Instead, the government 
could lessen the need to extend to students large amounts of credit by 
reducing the price of education through public support.283 When the 
price of education is lower, students and taxpayers are harmed less 
when an educational investment does not succeed, yet student access 
remains undiminished.284 Finally, an emphasis on public support for 
education allows the government far greater oversight of educational 
inputs and outputs than even the most intricate regulatory regime.285 
Of course, public support of higher education is by no means a 
panacea for all that ails higher education. This approach sacrifices a 
great degree of consumer choice in the marketplace for higher 
education.286 As current state funding levels demonstrate, a further 
emphasis on public support would leave many students at the mercy 
of the budgetary process, whereas Title IV aid—particularly the 
guaranteed loan program—is, for better or for worse, quite 
dependable.287 Although shifting from Title IV’s portable-subsidy 
approach to the public-support approach would require consideration 
of many more interests than are addressed in this Note, such a 
strategic shift would directly address the particular problems posed by 
for-profit colleges’ relationship with Title IV. The public-support 
model relieves federal student aid’s essential tension by striving to 
reduce poor student outcomes and fostering the increased levels of 
access to education promoted by Title IV. It does this all without 
singling out for-profit institutions within the higher-education 
marketplace. 
 
 282. See supra Part IV.B. 
 283. For an explanation of how this approach lowers costs, see supra notes 180–182 and 
accompanying text. 
 284. Contrast this approach with today’s “high-price, high-aid” model, as described in 
Glater, supra note 20, at 41–42. 
 285. See Pusser, supra note 13, at 35 (“[W]here education is provided in public institutions 
with public funds, the public has the greatest influence over the institution and its activities.”). 
 286. See id. at 36 (noting the value of consumer choice in higher education). 
 287. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
For many prospective college students, Title IV federal student 
aid is the gateway to a better future. Without it, obtaining a valuable 
education would not be possible. But for many former students of for-
profit institutions, Title IV has been nothing but the enabler of an 
oppressive financial situation. Indeed, the incredible success of many 
for-profit institutions has exposed the essential tension within Title 
IV. The program seeks to better individuals and society by expanding 
access to higher education, but by facilitating that access, the program 
often leaves students worse off. As long as Title IV pursues its goals 
by enabling students as market actors with portable subsidies and 
easy access to credit, this tension will remain. Efforts to rein in 
negative student outcomes will result in a reduction in access for the 
students who need it most. 
The solution to this dilemma, then, is to shift from Title IV’s 
student-oriented aid model and reemphasize public supply of higher 
education, characterized by direct investment in institutions to lower 
the cost of education and lessen students’ need for aid. Obviously, 
this policy shift requires consideration of many more factors than 
discussed in this Note. But if curing negative student outcomes caused 
by for-profit institutions without reducing access to education were 
policymakers’ supreme concern, this approach would indeed address 
it effectively and fairly. 
 
